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The Admission of Hearsay Testimony under the Doctrine of
Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing in Domestic Violence Cases:
Advice for Prosecutors and Courts
BY: ISLEY MARKMAN
I. INTRODUCTION

T

wo recent Supreme Court decisions about the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause, Crawford v.
Washington1 and Giles v. California,2 have affected
how prosecutors pursue domestic violence cases by
limiting their ability to use out-of-court statements made by the
victim in lieu of direct testimony from the victim at trial. The
unwillingness of victims to testify is typical of domestic violence cases, and as a result, courts have recognized the unique
need to admit hearsay testimony in these cases. In Crawford, the
Court articulated two exceptions to the Confrontation Clause:
the non-testimonial exception and the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
exception.3 Since that decision, many lower courts have broadly
construed the non-testimonial category to admit out-of-court
statements in domestic violence cases. I argue that instead, both
prosecutors and lower courts should focus on the forfeiture-bywrongdoing exception to admit hearsay testimony in domestic
violence cases in which the victim is unavailable to testify, either because she is unwilling to cooperate with law enforcement or because she was killed by the batterer. Dicta from the
Supreme Court in Giles and cases from New York state courts
provide guidance on how this exception should accommodate
the realities of a domestic violence relationship. As applied in
these cases, the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, in comparison to the non-testimonial exception, provides a more effective
litigation strategy for prosecutors and is more protective of the
rights of defendants.
In Part II, I discuss the expansion of hearsay exceptions to
admit out-of-court statements by victims in domestic violence
cases before the Crawford decision. In Part III, I summarize the
Crawford decision and explain its effect on the admissibility
of hearsay testimony in domestic violence cases. In Part IV,
I examine lower court decisions admitting hearsay under the
non-testimonial exception and argue that these decisions cut
against the intent of Crawford. In Part V, using dicta from the
Supreme Court in Giles and cases from New York as a guide,
I explain how the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception can be
adapted to admit hearsay in domestic violence cases in light of
the unique nature of these personal relationships. Finally, in Part
VI, I argue that for domestic violence cases, the forfeiture-by-
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wrongdoing exception is both a better strategy for prosecutors
and more protective of defendants’ rights than the non-testimonial exception.

II. BEFORE CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
Before 2004, the Supreme Court’ decision in Ohio v. Roberts governed the admissibility of hearsay statements under the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.5 In Roberts, the Court
decided that out-of-court statements are admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause if the declarant is unavailable
and the statements bear adequate “indicia of reliability.”6 The
Court explained, “[r]eliability can be inferred . . . in a case where
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception [or
where there are] particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”7
Under Ohio v. Roberts, prosecutors relied on various hearsay exceptions to admit out-of-court statements at trial. Under
the “excited utterance” or “present sense impression” exceptions, codified in Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1) and (2) respectively, courts admitted victims’ 911 calls and statements to
responding officers, treating physicians, or friends and family
made closely following the event of abuse while the victims
were still under duress and when the statements pertained to that
event.8 These hearsay exceptions apply regardless of the availability of the declarant. Prosecutors also relied on the forfeitureby-wrongdoing hearsay exception, which is codified in Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6).9 This exception, which only applies
when the declarant is unavailable, allows the admission of hearsay when the defendant’s actions render the victim unavailable
as a witness and the defendant had the specific intent to cause
that result.10 This exception was most easily applied in cases in
which a criminal investigation or prosecution for prior domestic abuse was already pending, and the defendant subsequently
threatened or actually harmed the victim to prevent her from
testifying against him.
Other hearsay exceptions were expanded to accommodate
the need for out-of-court evidence in domestic violence cases
where victims were unavailable to testify. For example, in most
cases, statements made by a victim to a doctor identifying a perpetrator are not admissible through the “Medical Diagnosis or
Treatment” hearsay exception;11 yet in domestic violence cases,
4
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courts admitted these identifying statements as being reasonably pertinent to a medical diagnosis or treatment.12 In addition, some state legislatures enacted special hearsay exceptions
for domestic violence cases. Enacted in 1996 in reaction to the
O.J. Simpson trial, in which the court excluded all evidence of
past domestic abuse by the defendant, § 1370 of the California
Evidence Code allows the admission of hearsay statements in
domestic violence cases where: (1) the statement was recorded,
written, or made to a law enforcement officer or physician; (2)
the statement was made soon after the threat of or actual physical abuse and described the incident; (3) the circumstances of
the statement indicate its trustworthiness; and (4) the declarant
is unavailable to testify.13
Accordingly, before Crawford, prosecutors were easily
able to prosecute domestic violence cases by admitting hearsay
testimony from the victim when she was unavailable to testify
at trial, often through the expansion of exceptions to the rule
against hearsay.

III. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND ITS EFFECTS ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
Recent Supreme Court decisions have affected the admission of hearsay evidence in domestic violence cases. In Crawford, the Court decided that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause prohibits the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements made by a witness who does not appear at trial, unless
that witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine her.14 Even testimonial statements admissible under well-established hearsay exceptions
cannot be admitted if the declarant has not been cross-examined
by the defendant.15 Thus with regard to testimonial statements,
Crawford overturned Roberts.16
After Crawford, hearsay statements offered against a defendant in a criminal case potentially are admissible under the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause through two avenues.
First, since Crawford applies only to testimonial statements, the
admissibility of non-testimonial statements is still governed by
the Roberts “indicia of reliability” test.17 Second, the forfeitureby-wrongdoing doctrine, which provides an exception to both
the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, allows
prosecutors to introduce testimonial and non-testimonial out-ofcourt statements.18 As the Court stated in Crawford, “the rule of
forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.”19
Therefore, “one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”20
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Crawford was thought to have disastrous effects for domestic violence prosecutions because victims are so often unwilling
to testify.21 According to one report, within
days—even hours—of the Crawford decision, prosecutors were dismissing or losing hundreds of domestic
violence cases that would have presented little difficulty in the past. For example, during the summer of
2004, half of the domestic violence cases set for trial
in Dallas County, Texas, were dismissed because of
evidentiary problems under Crawford.22
An anecdotal experience of mine highlights the issues raised by
Crawford. While I was working as an intern in the Domestic Violence Unit of the King’s County District Attorney’s Office in
Brooklyn, New York, an Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”)
there was prosecuting a case in which the defendant had allegedly beaten and stabbed his wife and fired a gun in her presence
upon suspecting that she was cheating on him. Although they
had never legally separated, the defendant constantly moved
in and out of their home. On a family vacation months prior
to the incident at issue, the defendant physically assaulted his
wife during a fight and local police forced him to leave their
residence for the night. In her testimony to the grand jury, the
victim asserted that the defendant, who had not been living with
her at the time, showed up at her residence with a gun, beat
her in the face, pushed a knife to her throat, fired a gun, and
prevented her from seeking help or leaving the house for the
entire night. A few days before trial, the victim, who was then
residing in Florida, informed the ADA that she was unwilling
to return to New York to testify at trial. Because grand jury
testimony is objectively testimonial,23 unless the ADA could
prove forfeiture-by-wrongdoing the victim’s grand jury testimony was not admissible under Crawford. Without testimony
from the victim or the grand jury testimony, the prosecution had
no case to present at trial.

IV. DECISIONS AFTER CRAWFORD:
NON-TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
While Crawford became an impediment to the admission
of grand jury testimony and other clearly testimonial evidence
(e.g., ex parte testimony from a preliminary hearing), it did not
have the disastrous effect that many feared. In domestic violence cases decided since Crawford where the victim was unavailable to testify, courts have narrowly construed the meaning
of “testimonial” to conform to already-expanded hearsay exceptions. Consequently, many types of hearsay are just as admissible now as they were prior to Crawford.

Spring 2011

The Crawford decision failed to provide a clear definition
of “testimonial.” However, two years later in Davis v. Washington (and a consolidated case, Hammon v. Indiana) the Court
explained that whether statements are testimonial depends upon
their primary purpose.24 Davis and Hammon, which parsed the
potentially broad meaning of “testimonial,” were seen as a victory for domestic violence prosecutors. While the Court found
that Hammon’s statements to responding officers were testimonial
and therefore inadmissible under Crawford, the
Court determined that the
911 call at issue in Davis
was non-testimonial and
could be admitted.25
Despite the guidance provided by Davis
and Hammon, the Court
has yet to provide a clear
test for testimonial statements. In Crawford, the
Court presented possible formulations of
the standard including
(a) whether the declarant would expect her
statements to be used in a prosecution, and (b) whether the
statements were made under circumstances that would lead
an objective witness to believe that they would be used later
in trial. However, the Court declined to adopt either test.26 In
Davis, the Court seemed to focus on the intent of questioning
officers in obtaining the statements but again did not clearly
articulate a universal standard.27 Instead, the Court provided a
vague guide tied to the facts of the case:

The Court in Davis attempted to create a dichotomy between
a plea for help and providing information for an investigation.
In reality, however, such a clean divide is often fictional29 and
as case law shows, Davis failed to establish a bright-line distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements.
Rather, Davis opened the door to admitting any statements that
could be contextualized as responding to an “ongoing emergency.”30
In the absence of
clear guidance, many
courts in domestic violence cases following
Davis have narrowly
construed the definition of “testimonial” in
order to admit hearsay
from 911 calls, statements to responding officers on the scene, and
statements to non-police
officers. First, courts
have failed to parse and
redact portions of 911
calls as directed by the
Davis Court. In Davis,
the Court pointed to the
facts of the case and explained that “a conversation which begins as an interrogation
to determine the need for emergency assistance” can “evolve
into testimonial statements.”31 If so, the Court instructed, lower
courts may need to redact those portions of the 911 call that
have “become testimonial.”32 While some courts have closely
followed these instructions and parsed 911 calls,33 other courts
have focused on the primary purpose of the call more generally
and have found that responses to questions about the defendant’s identity and history were non-testimonial and therefore
admissible.34
Second, with regard to statements to responding officers,
some cases have followed Hammon closely and found that a
victim’s statements to responding officers on the scene and describing the incident are testimonial.35 However, other courts
have treated the span of the ongoing emergency more liberally,
holding that statements to responding officers were not testimonial when the officers arrived at the scene promptly after the 911
call or when the victim was visibly upset, even if the danger was
over or paramedics were already treating the victim.36 One court
even found statements made to officers at the police station to
be “a plea for help in the face of a bona fide physical threat”
and therefore non-testimonial.37 Another court found statements

In the absence of clear guidance,

many courts in domestic violence
cases following Davis have

narrowly construed the definition
of “testimonial” in order to admit

hearsay from 911 calls, statements to

responding officers on the scene, and
statements to non-police officers.

Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements—or even all
conceivable statements in response to police interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial,
it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in
the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.28
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made to law enforcement officers in a formal setting and absent
any danger or emergency to be non-testimonial.38
Third, courts have admitted nearly all statements made to
non-law enforcement officers. Even though “neither Crawford
nor Davis limited testimonial statements to those obtained by
law enforcement or their agents,”39 lower courts have universally held that “statements made to non-government questioners
who are not acting in concert with or as agents of the government are considered non-testimonial.”40 This approach is logical
with regard to statements to friends and family since presumably neither the victim nor the third party intended to make or
elicit those statements for the purpose of a criminal prosecution.
However, courts have found that statements made by a victim
to doctors and counselors are non-testimonial, even when state
law requires doctors to report the incident to the police.41 These
cases stretch the limits of a common sense interpretation of “testimonial” and may run counter to dicta in Davis, which treated
911 operators as agents of the police.42
In Crawford, the Supreme Court determined that a defendant’s Confrontation Clause right to test the evidence against
him through cross-examination is not protected by judicial findings of reliability under state hearsay laws.43 These lower court
cases show that, at least in the context of domestic violence, this
distinction has not effectively narrowed the types of statements
that are admissible. While some types of hearsay statements are
indisputably testimonial, courts read the vague Davis standard
to admit a significant amount of hearsay evidence as non-testimonial and therefore as unaffected by Crawford.44 Because of
this ability to bypass Crawford in many cases, in practice the
decision has not had the crippling effect on domestic violence
prosecutions that many anticipated.

V. DECISIONS AFTER CRAWFORD:
FORFEITURE-BY-WRONGDOING
In many domestic violence cases, the hearsay statements
that prosecutors seek to admit are ex parte testimony from a
preliminary or grand jury hearing. Because these statements fall
squarely within the definition of “testimonial,”45 the government
must rely upon the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception rather
than the non-testimonial exception to admit the statements at
trial. Although many argue that the criteria established in Giles
is too restrictive, dicta from Giles and New York state cases
demonstrate how courts can and should interpret the forfeitureby-wrongdoing doctrine to admit hearsay evidence, particularly in light of the realities of domestic abuse. These cases are
instructive both for lethal cases like Giles, where the act for
which the defendant is on trial (e.g., homicide) and the act that
allegedly silenced the victim are the same, and for non-lethal
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cases where the defendant took separate actions before trial to
discourage the victim from testifying.

A. GILES V. CALIFORNIA
In Giles, the Supreme Court clarified Crawford’s implications for the doctrine of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing and held
that the doctrine can be applied only when “the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.”46 In that case, the defendant admitted to shooting the
victim multiple times but claimed at trial that he had done so in
self-defense.47 The prosecutors sought to introduce statements
that the victim made to a police officer responding to a domestic violence report three weeks before the shooting, in which
she told the officer that the defendant physically assaulted and
threatened to kill her.48 The trial court admitted these hearsay
statements on the theory of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, but did
not consider whether at the time of the murder the defendant had
the specific intent to prevent the victim from testifying.49 The
California Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant
had committed an intentional criminal act that rendered the victim unavailable to testify.50 The United States Supreme Court
reversed and remanded.51 The majority explained that in cases
in which the defendant merely has the intent to cause a person to
be absent but not the specific intent to prevent her from testifying, the doctrine of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing does not apply.52
To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would require the judge
to usurp the jury’s role by deciding whether the defendant murdered the victim.53
Three of the opinions in Giles discussed the implications of
the Court’s decision for lethal domestic violence cases. Justice
Breyer, writing for the dissent, noted the following:
Each year, domestic violence results in more than
1,500 deaths and more than 2 million injuries; it accounts for a substantial portion of all homicides; it
typically involves a history of repeated violence; and
it is difficult to prove in court because the victim is
generally reluctant or unable to testify.54
Justice Breyer argued that only knowledge, and not purpose,
should be required for the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine
to apply because a knowledge requirement accords with the rationale of disincentivizing attempts by defendants to obstruct
justice.55 In contrast, Justice Breyer noted, a purpose requirement places too high a burden on the prosecution56 and leads to
absurd results.57
In response to Justice Breyer, the majority and concurring
opinions asserted that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, as
interpreted by the Court, would continue to admit the hearsay
testimony of a victim in domestic violence cases if the prosecution could demonstrate a pattern of domestic violence and a his-
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tory of attempts by the defendant to control the victim.58 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, explained:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, and
include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions.
Where such an abusive relationship culminates in
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the
crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to
stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution – rendering her
prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help would
be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence
of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim
would have been expected to testify.59
Similarly, Justice Souter argued:
[T]he element of intention would normally be satisfied
by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser
in the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to
isolate the victim from outside help, including the aid
of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this sort, it would make no sense to suggest
that the oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned
the dynamics of abuse the instant before he killed his
victim, say in a fit of anger.60
A majority of justices, therefore, suggested that evidence of a
history of domestic abuse by the defendant against the victim
would be sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant had the
specific intent to silence the victim when he killed her, perhaps
even absent a pending case at the time of the murder.61
While domestic violence groups had filed amicus curiae
briefs arguing that a specific intent requirement “would cripple
the truth-seeking purpose and integrity of adjudications and create an incentive for batterers to kill their victims,”62 after the
case was decided these same groups highlighted the portions
of the majority and concurring opinions addressing domestic
violence as “a victory for the domestic violence community.”63
The Court’s dicta appropriately reflected both the unique nature
of domestic violence relationships, in which one person acts to
control the other, and the reality of domestic violence prosecutions, in which the only evidence may be statements made by
the victim to law enforcement about prior incidents of domestic abuse that would be considered testimonial and subject to
Crawford.
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In doing so, the Court provided an avenue for prosecutors and courts to use the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception
to prosecute domestic violence cases effectively. With respect
to lethal domestic violence cases, the Court explicitly invited
prosecutors to present evidence of a history of domestic abuse
to demonstrate that, by killing the victim, the defendant had
the requisite specific intent to silence her. With respect to nonlethal cases, the dicta from Giles should also influence courts to
consider the realities of domestic violence relationships. Several
cases from New York provide a model for this approach.

B. NEW YORK CASES
New York courts have relied upon expert evidence to define which types of acts, other than overt threats or violence,
qualify as wrongdoing in the domestic violence context. For
example, even before Crawford, a New York state court in
People v. Santiago recognized “that in domestic violence cases
repeated abuse followed by repeated withdrawal of prosecution
and the repeated grant of forgiveness to the abuser make such
cases very different from the norm.”64 In an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the defendant forfeited his Confrontation
Clause rights, the prosecution presented the testimony of an expert in domestic violence and Battered Woman’s Syndrome.65
The expert testified that “domestic violence is part of the effort
by one partner to dominate and control the other” and that “[d]
omestic violence is characterized by the three phases of behavior which are commonly referred to as the ‘cycle of violence.’
These are (1) the tension building phase, (2) the violent phase,
and (3) the honeymoon phase.”66 The tension building and
violent phases are self-explanatory; the honeymoon phase “is
characterized by acts of contrition by the abuser, his requests
for forgiveness and his declarations of love . . . [which] exploit
the complainant’s fantasies of happiness and harmony and her
hope that, notwithstanding previous abuse, a loving relationship can and will continue.”67 A victim of domestic abuse may
be unwilling to testify because she feels threatened or blames
herself for the abuse. More significantly, a batterer’s promise of
a better future and reconciliation, which often occurs between
arrest and trial and is characteristic of the “honeymoon phase,”
may discourage a victim from seeking assistance or testifying
against him.68 In Santiago, the court found that the defendant
had forfeited his right to confront the unavailable victim based
upon the prosecution’s showing at the evidentiary hearing that
the victim suffered from Battered Woman’s Syndrome, caused
by the defendant, and that the defendant had made numerous
“honeymoon” promises to the victim between his arrest and the
trial.69 Accordingly, the court permitted the prosecution to introduce the victim’s grand jury testimony.70
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A New York appellate court issued similar a decision following Crawford.71 In People v. Byrd, the trial court admitted
the grand jury testimony of the victim after the prosecution
demonstrated through an expert witness that the victim suffered
from Battered Woman’s Syndrome.72 Similar to the Santiago
court, the trial court in Byrd court reasoned that the defendant’s
visits with, and hundreds of phone calls to, the victim while
she was hospitalized after the incident of abuse were typical
of the “honeymoon” phase of domestic violence and were intended to procure her silence.73 The appellate court upheld the
lower court’s reasoning, asserting that testimony about Battered
Woman’s Syndrome and the victim’s history of domestic abuse
“was relevant to place defendant’s actions in context to show
that he had such a degree of control over [the victim] that seemingly innocuous calls or hospital visits would have a coercive
effect on her.”74
The Supreme Court’s decision in Giles did not limit nor
implicitly overrule the decisions of the New York courts in
Santiago and Byrd. Giles, a lethal domestic violence case, established that absent other evidence
courts could not assume that by
murdering the victim, the defendant
had the specific intent to prevent
her from testifying as a witness.75
Santiago and Byrd, on the other
hand, involved non-lethal incidents
of domestic violence in which the
defendants took additional action
after arrest and before trial to discourage the victims from testifying. Moreover, the New York Court
of Appeals already had imposed a
specific intent requirement for forfeiture-by-wronging (like the U.S.
Supreme Court did in Giles) before
Santiago and Byrd were decided.76
The Santiago and Byrd courts simply distinguished Maher.77 If anything, Giles encouraged the
type of evidence and arguments accepted in the New York cases
by inviting “prosecutors to make salient the full spectrum of
abuse that resulted in a live victim’s absence from trial.”78

silence the victim even if that victim is still alive. Alternatively,
lower courts should admit hearsay testimony pursuant to a finding that, in light of the defendant’s history of domestic violence
with the victim, the defendant intended to procure the victim’s
silence through specific actions taken after the defendant’s arrest that are characteristic of the “honeymoon” phase.

As the Supreme Court in Giles and lower courts across the
country have acknowledged, domestic violence crimes are notoriously hard to prosecute. Not only are these crimes significantly underreported, but also victims often recant their earlier
statements and refuse to testify at trial.79 When victims refuse to
testify, typically the prosecution’s only potential evidence is outof-court statements. In recognition of these inherent problems
in domestic violence cases, many
courts have narrowly construed the
category of testimonial statements
vaguely defined in Crawford and
Davis to admit hearsay evidence.
Yet despite the Court’s apparent
invitation in Giles, with the exception of a few cases from New York,
lower courts have yet to use the
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception
to admit hearsay statements on the
ground that the defendant’s history
of domestic violence toward the
victim or subsequent “honeymoon”
acts effectively prevented the victim
from testifying. It is unclear whether
courts have rejected this argument
or whether prosecutors have failed
80
to advance it. Regardless, this approach should change; prosecutors and courts should rely on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine because it is a more effective prosecution strategy and
is more protective of defendants’ rights.

C. IN SUMMARY: LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL CASES

A. BENEFICIAL PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY

In light of the Court’s invitation in Giles, lower courts
across the country should tailor the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine to the realities of domestic violence relationships. In
lethal domestic violence cases, evidence of a history of domestic violence should create the presumption that by killing the
victim, the defendant had the specific intent to silence her. In
non-lethal cases, this same history of violence alone may be
sufficient to support a finding that the defendant intended to

The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is a better prosecution strategy than the non-testimonial exception. First, the
doctrine applies to a broader spectrum of evidence than the nontestimonial exception. When a defendant forfeits his Confrontation Clause rights with regard to the victim, all out-of-court
statements made by the victim are potentially admissible. This
means that all types of hearsay, including testimony from preliminary and grand jury hearings, are admissible upon a singular

VI. A COMPARISON OF THE TWO CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE EXCEPTIONS: FORFEITURE-BY-WRONGDOING
AND NON-TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS

In non-lethal cases, this

same history of violence
alone may be sufficient

to support a finding that

the defendant intended to
silence the victim even if
that victim is still alive.
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showing of forfeiture. In contrast, the non-testimonial exception can only be used to admit certain categories of hearsay and
requires prosecutors to prove that each individual out-of-court
statement is non-testimonial.
Second, the use of expert testimony to prove forfeiture-bywrongdoing in domestic violence cases may increase awareness
of domestic violence issues over time. As experts have recognized, Battered Woman’s Syndrome can both explain victims’
unwillingness to testify and their hesitation or recantation if and
when they do testify. If lower courts across the country are willing to hear testimony about the cycles of domestic violence and
Battered Woman’s Syndrome in determining evidentiary issues,
this may further public awareness about the prevalence and effects of domestic violence.81 In turn, increased public awareness
may help jurors understand why some victims seem hesitant on
the witness stand and why others refuse to testify altogether.
Laws have the power to inform and change our social mores.82
By educating the public about the nature of domestic violence,
it is less likely that jurors will misinterpret a victim’s hesitance
or absence as a lack of credibility.83

B. PROTECTIVE OF DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS
An increased reliance on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine rather than the non-testimonial exception will also be
more protective of defendants’ rights. First, as discussed supra
Part III, the Supreme Court in Crawford explicitly separated
the Confrontation Clause inquiry from the reliability inquiry
of state hearsay law.84 By broadly construing the meaning of
“non-testimonial” under Davis to include categories of statements admissible under hearsay exceptions, lower court decisions have eroded this distinction and cut against defendants’
Sixth Amendment rights as outlined in Crawford.85 As the Court
explained,
[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause
was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations
as evidence against the accused . . . Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence
would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to
prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.86
Second, because the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception is
applied only in cases in which the defendant has taken affirmative actions to deny the prosecution the ability to call one of its
witnesses, reliance on this exception means that a defendant’s
own actions will determine whether he receives constitutional
protection. In contrast, the applicability of the non-testimonial
exception depends on the conduct of the police and the alleged
victim (e.g., whether the victim called 911 or how soon officers
arrived at the crime scene). Affording a defendant control over
his own constitutional right to confront witnesses against him
Criminal Law Brief

is more just in the sense that it conforms constitutional rights
to the moral content of the defendant’s actions. In addition, by
conditioning the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights on the
actions of others, the non-testimonial exception may create perverse incentives for law enforcement:
Rather than resolving emergencies before conducting
an investigation, police officers might be inclined to
gather as much information as possible during a pending emergency in order to evade the Confrontation
Clause. 911 operators, for instance, might be instructed
to press callers for information about their assailants
during the emergency rather than guide them to safety
and then ask questions.87
Third, reliance on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine
instead of the non-testimonial exception in domestic violence
cases will also protect the rights of criminal defendants in other
types of cases. In acknowledgement of the difficulty of prosecuting domestic violence cases, courts have favored admitting
hearsay testimony.88 However, a broadly construed non-testimonial exception in domestic violence cases not only opens the
door to the admission of more hearsay in domestic violence
cases, but it also leads to the admission of hearsay that would
otherwise violate the Confrontation Clause in all other types of
cases. For example, as discussed supra Part IV, courts dealing
with the difficulties presented by domestic violence cases have
taken a liberal view as to when a victim’s statements to responding officers should be considered non-testimonial. While these
liberal classifications of non-testimonial hearsay theoretically
may be confined to domestic violence cases, because the unique
nature of domestic violence relationships was not part of the
courts’ rationales in these decisions, it is more likely that these
rules will be applied to other crimes (e.g., burglary). In contrast, expansive interpretations of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine in domestic violence cases would be based entirely on
the realities and patterns of domestic violence. They would,
therefore, be more likely to remain limited to domestic violence
cases, in which the admission of hearsay is especially necessary.

C. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
Although there are likely many objections to the position I
have taken in this paper, I will respond only to two particularly
compelling objections. First, because the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is an equitable remedy rather than a rule based
on the reliability of evidence, there is a danger that expanding
the doctrine would allow the admission of a flood of unreliable
hearsay in domestic violence trials. This danger is compounded
by the fact that forfeiture-by-wrongdoing is also a hearsay exception, and therefore, most state hearsay laws will not filter
out these out-of-court statements.89 However, the admissibility of all evidence is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 403
15

(or corresponding state rules), which permits judges to exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
its prejudicial effect.90 Thus, even if a defendant has forfeited
his Confrontation Clause rights, judges through Rule 403 may
act as gatekeepers to prohibit the entry of unreliable evidence.
Second, some feminist scholars have criticized policies
adopted by law enforcement that require mandatory arrest
and prosecution in domestic violence cases.91 These scholars
argue that mandatory intervention policies may increase future
violence against the victim92 and, more importantly, strip domestic violence victims of the ability to choose whether or not
their case will be prosecuted.93 Wendy McElroy championed
the Crawford decision as an equitable solution to this problem:
“Domestic violence victims who wish to press charges can benefit from increased sensitivity while those who decline to press
charges can exercise control by refusing to cooperate with authorities. The wishes of the victim may once again become legally significant.”94 By admitting hearsay in domestic violence
cases through the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, courts
will allow prosecutors to pursue cases without the consent and
participation of victims. Of course, this criticism applies equally
to courts’ reliance on the non-testimonial exception.

VII. CONCLUSION
The unwillingness of domestic violence victims to testify
at trial due to the psychological effects of domestic violence or
specific actions by batterers is a notorious impediment to prosecuting domestic violence cases. In addition, domestic violence
cases, which often come down to the defendant’s word versus
the victim’s, are nearly impossible to prosecute without hearsay
testimony when the victim has been killed because there is no
other way to present the victim’s side of the story.
Courts have historically looked for ways to stretch existing law to admit hearsay evidence in domestic violence cases.
Before Crawford, when the admissibility of evidence under the
Confrontation Clause depended on whether the statements at
issue fell within an established hearsay exception or were otherwise trustworthy, courts expanded many hearsay exceptions
to admit out-of-court victim statements. After Crawford and
Davis, in which the Court held that the admissibility of statements under the Confrontation Clause depended on whether the
statements were deemed testimonial, lower courts proceeded to
stretch the meaning of “non-testimonial” to admit out-of-court
statements in accordance with these already-expanded hearsay
exceptions.
This has been a mistake. Instead of further expanding the
non-testimonial exception, courts should adapt the forfeitureby-wrongdoing doctrine to account for the realities of domestic
abuse. In both lethal and non-lethal domestic violence cases,
16

courts should accept evidence of a history of domestic abuse as
probative of the defendant’s specific intent to prevent the victim
from testifying. Additionally, in non-lethal cases, courts should
follow decisions from New York and recognize that actions
taken by the defendant after his arrest and leading up to trial
that are typical of the “honeymoon” phase of domestic abuse
may procure a victim’s silence in the same way as overt threats.
If prosecutors assert these arguments and courts are willing to
accept them, several beneficial effects will follow. First, use of
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine will be more protective
of defendants’ rights. Second, it will aid prosecutors by facilitating the admission of a broader spectrum of hearsay. Finally,
it may have positive effects on society at large by increasing
public awareness about Battered Woman’s Syndrome and the
cycle of violence inherent in domestic violence relationships.
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